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• Then, it was discovered that some HP laptops come with a built-in feature you did not ask for, a keylogger, could be exploited to monitor the keystrokes of users. 2 (Although there was no indication that this feature was installed on purpose or that the log files were going anywhere, the feeling that your passwords might be stored in clear text on your machine was still disconcerting.) • To top off the week, on May 12, the WannaCry ransomware made its rounds, affecting critical infrastructure, government, and educational institutions around the world (including the U.K. National Health Service [NHS] , Renault automotive factory in France, Spanish telecom providers, FedEx in the United States, tax offices in Brazil, the Russian Interior Ministry, and Chinese universities). 3 The real showstopper here is the WannaCry attack. Was an incident like this to be expected? Could it have been prevented? And where does it leave us going forward? The answer to the first two questions is "yes," while the third question is a little more nuanced. So, let's dive in.
WannaCry was a security team's worst nightmare (one of them at least). A vulnerability of various and widely used Windows operating systems (OSs; current and end-oflife [EOL] versions like Windows XP, Windows 8, and Windows Server 2003) that had been leaked as part of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence Agency dump of secret hacking tools 4 fell into the hands of the hacker community, then was turned into a ransomware worm with the capability of spreading across networks and infecting systems with like vulnerabilities. And it did so very quickly and efficiently, at least for a while.
Recap of Events
Early on May 12, security news sites started to report a large-scale outbreak at the U.K. NHS, in parallel with larger outages outside of healthcare reported elsewhere in Europe. Pretty soon, it became apparent that this was the same attack and that it involved ransomware that had self-distributing capabilities (i.e., a malware worm).
However, while the NHS had to shut down several dozen facilities, turn patients away, and postpone procedures, the U.S. healthcare system was not as severely affected. However, incidents were reported in the United States, including infections of medical devices 5 and a few hospitals experiencing limited outbreaks. (For example, one Symantec customer
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reported an incident on its test network that did not traverse to production.) Did the U.S. healthcare system just get lucky? Well, first off, all of healthcare has to live with the problem of running EOL software, as well as the reality of systems that are behind in patch level-be it for regulatory or compliance reasons, vendor-mandated restrictions, or just practical, staffing, or financial limitations. However, based on published reports, I tend to believe that the prevalence of legacy systems is much more extensive in the U.K. NHS than in U.S. healthcare. 6, 7 Second, in the United States, we had a 6-hour (give or take a time zone) warning that helped bring teams together to start executing emergency defense plans. I learned that many hospitals had their teams working through the weekend.
Last, a serious design flaw in WannaCry allowed a security researcher in the United Kingdom to lay claim on the web domain associated with the malware's command-andcontrol server, effectively slowing its spread to a crawl-some referred to it as the "kill switch." 8 By the time the virus author had remediated the problem and released an updated version, most organizations had their defenses up and could stop the second attempt.
In summary, the United States was less affected by WannaCry due to having a somewhat smaller attack surface (fewer vulnerable systems and better defenses) and having had a head start. 9 In general, the industries affected had one or both of these characteristics: 1. Those that due to regulation and system restraints, tend to run older or unpatched platforms. (I would put healthcare, manufacturing, transportation, and utilities in this group.) 2. Those that tend to spend less on information technology (IT) in general and less on security in particular. (This would be education and many government institutionsno matter where in the world.) Therefore, in a sense, no particular industry was targeted. Instead, it was a group of industries that shared common characteristics that happened to fit the attack profile of the malware.
What Have We Learned?
Although this type of an attack should not have come as a surprise, it still was very much a shot across the bow-and hopefully a wake-up call.
The information-sharing groups that responded quickly and provided regular information updates as the situation unfolded deserve a tip of the hat. The Department of Health & Human Services had daily calls through the weekend. InfraGard, which is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the private sector (and specifically the InfraGard Cyber Health Working Group); the HIMSS Privacy & Security group; and NH-ISAC provided regular updates on the situation, and the various listservs were buzzing. AAMI provided updates specific to the medical device part of the problem. 10, 11 Commercial entities (e.g., Symantec) provided customers with up-to-date defenses, threat intelligence, and remediation advice. 12 Also of note, the underlying vulnerability had been known following the NSA tool dump by the Shadow Brokers hacker group in March. 4 (The availability of the tools was announced in March, allowing Microsoft to issue a patch, and the password to access the tools was not released until early April.) Therefore, at least for the systems that are still running supported OSs, this all could have been avoided through timely patching, and any antimalware program should have received a signature update.
We now know that the majority of systems affected were actually running Windows 7. Only a few systems were running EOL OSs (e.g., Windows XP) and therefore did not have a patch available at the time of the outbreak. (One was issued by Microsoft the day after the initial outbreak.) Clearly, therefore, this was more a problem of patch management than a problem of legacy devices. The time between the NSA tools breach and the first exploitation (via WannaCry) was only 5 weeks. Simply put, if the bad guys are that fast, we need to be even faster.
Systems that are no longer supported are particularly vulnerable. Moreover, although getting rid of all legacy systems and keeping everything else updated and patched may be desirable, unfortunately, that is neither All of healthcare has to live with the problem of running end-of-life software, as well as the reality of systems that are behind in patch levelbe it for regulatory or compliance reasons, vendor-mandated restrictions, or just practical, staffing, or financial limitations.
practical nor feasible. We have to try to minimize the "window of vulnerability," but it will never be zero.
Any organization with complex IT infrastructures, including legacy systems, has to deploy a "defense-in-depth" approach, starting with the best possible protection for systems and using network segregation and networkbased intrusion prevention tools. In addition, not only is your security only as good as its weakest link, it's also only as good as your vigilance. Staying prepared, responding quickly, and maintaining a network of trusted partners are key aspects of effective vigilance.
How Bad Was It?
To be honest, the WannaCry attack could have been much worse. Even though we have learned of a few 100,000 infected systems across 100 or more countries, the malware was far from well developed. It contained several mistakes that prevented much more damage and prevented the attackers from walking away with a lot more money.
(Estimates indicate that they received just a few $10,000.) Some have hypothesized that WannaCry was released prematurely and had not been completely developed and tested. Therefore, although this has been labeled as the largest cyberattack (which it was notother malware has infected more computers) or an attack of unprecedented impact (which I believe is accurate given the high number of interrupted businesses and destroyed data), we still managed to dodge the "really big one."
The next attack may be more difficult to contain. A new attack might use one or more of the vulnerabilities disclosed by the Shadow Brokers dump, or a new version of WannaCry might be deployed (some attempts have already been made, though they have been unsuccessful thus far). And because several industries, including healthcare, just sent a message to the world that they are poorly protected and rife with legacy and unpatched vulnerabilities, the next potential targets have already been defined.
Where Do We Go from Here?
The next step is the title of this article: It's time for belts and suspenders, meaning we need patches and backups. Although much more is needed, this is the most important first step. Patching will help maintain the best possible security posture, and backup is needed ... well, just in case.
In addition, whatever cannot be patched should be secured otherwise, via (for example) the network, security gateways, and proxies. As WannaCry was an internally spreading attack (after the first initial infection), it's also important to ensure that your security control points are well placed across your network, in order to have reasonable detection reliability.
Unfortunately, and for practical reasons, the patch approach has certain limitations:
• EOL software or systems: Even though Microsoft did release a patch for WannaCry, even for Windows XP machines, it was reactive and came after the event, as compared with still-supported OSs that had patches provided in March.
• In general and specifically with medical devices, patch deployment is typically slow and, thus, a significant "window of vulnerability" is left open. Therefore, security controls need to be enacted to compensate for this reality.
13
Because several industries, including healthcare, just sent a message to the world that they are poorly protected and rife with legacy and unpatched vulnerabilities, the next potential targets have already been defined.
• Systems with modified OSs: Although less of a problem with newer systems, modifying an OS was a common engineering practice back in the days when hard disk space and system resources were expensive. Designers removed the components of the OS that were not needed. Unfortunately, this may cause a conflict with the patch, as patching assumes that the target system has a full OS. As a result, the patch may fail, break the system, or succeed but result in a configuration that is not approved. For device manufacturers, I highly recommend including additional security measures on devices running any commercial OS or other software. Technologies like host intrusion detection and host intrusion prevention systems (HIDS/HIPS; commonly referred to as "whitelisting" [though that does not tell the whole story]) protect devices through file protection, process and behavior controls, and sandboxing. As a signatureless security technology, HIDS/HIPS can effectively reduce the patch pressure and provide additional security to systems that cannot be updated as frequently for the reasons discussed above-and it does so with little impact on resources. 14 Healthcare providers should take a focused and multistep approach to offset any security weaknesses of devices. First, discover all of your systems (emphasis on "all"). Then, determine whether each device runs one of the affected versions of software. If affected devices are found, the next step is to determine whether other mitigating measures can be taken (e.g., closing ports). Then, additional external security measures can be applied to protect the device. (Note: An infection may spread internally, so an external-facing network firewall would not be sufficient.) If a device is found to be vulnerable or cannot be protected externally, it should be considered for removal from the network (or segregated out of the group of devices, such as the patient monitoring network).
Ideally, patches should only be installed in coordination with the manufacturer to ensure that they are fully tested and their impact is clearly understood. However, the Food and Drug Administration has stated that hospitals could "issue simple patches or updates involving some devices, but they will assume the risk associated with that update." 15 If a healthcare organization decides to proceed, then careful planning and testing should precede a wider deployment of the patch.
Closing Thoughts
It's also important to note that WannaCry was actually the first ransomware to broadly affect medical devices and otherwise isolated systems, and it did not require humans to click on phishing emails or follow a bad web link. 16 In the United Kingdom, its impact was severe and it shut down hospitals-it had a direct impact on the delivery of care.
Even though medical devices are typically recoverable (in most cases you are less concerned about the data on the device and can just reinstall the software), any security compromise has great operational impact. If the electronic health record system goes down, you can still set broken bones and stop the bleeding, but without medical devices, the delivery of care is seriously hampered (e.g., due to lack of images and lab results).
WannaCry has set a new precedent for malicious attacks. Many more vulnerabilities (and more on the way) were leaked with the NSA data dump by Shadow Brokers, 17 all of which can be exploited in the future. And, of course, the bad guys have learned from the WannaCry mistakes.
WannaCry presented us with two choices: We can either lean back again and say, "Well, at least it wasn't that bad here in the United States," or we can take this seriously and learn from it. I hate to be a pessimist, but the next one is coming from where this one came. 18 For once, let's be ready. n If the electronic health record system goes down, you can still set broken bones and stop the bleeding, but without medical devices, the delivery of care is seriously hampered (e.g., due to lack of images and lab results).
